ANGLICARE WA & ANOR -v- DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY & CHILDREN'S SERVICES [2000] WASC 47

ANGLICARE WA & ANOR -v- DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY & CHILDREN'S SERVICES [2000] WASC 47
Facts:
The Department, is making a contested care and protection application in the Children's Court of WA in respect of six children who were apprehended last year.

The children range in age from nearly 13 to 4. Except for one child, they have been in foster care for some time separated from their parents and some of their brothers and sisters. It is important to everyone that the Children's Court proceedings are completed as soon as possible with all admissible evidence put before the magistrate.
Ms Keenan is a family and child counsellor she works for Anglicare WA and she was consulted by the family.

Between 22 July 1999 and 16 December 1999 she saw all of them, except one, on approximately six occasions. In the course of these sessions she has obtained information. To her belief during the course of these attendances she has not needed to comply with the legal requirements to notify the department of any reasonable grounds to suspect any of the children were abused or at risk of being abused.
Issue: the admissibility of information obtained by the counsellor during the sessions in a State Court – the FLA does not apply in a State court otherwise pursuant to the FLA the sessions would remain confidential
Held: inadmissible anything said by anyone at meetings, conferences or consultations due to the connection between the two state acts ie
I am of the view the Family Court Act s 64 conditions the directive to the Children's Court in the Child Welfare Act s 30 so as to exempt from admissibility, statements made in the course of counselling sessions with an authorised family and children's counsellor.
Considered
Relationships Australia v Pasternak (1996) 133 FLR 462.
Issue: whether a conflict between the paramountcy of the interests of the child and the public interests and the need to preserve the confidences of a counselling session.

The Court held in favour of the preservation of the confidence.

The case concerned proceedings entirely under the Family Law Act. Where the ordinary meaning of words in the statutes is plain
Distinguished due to:
a Judge cannot invest them with a different meaning in order to arrive at a solution which the particular Judge considers to be socially just. A Judge's duty is to interpret the words used by Parliament.

In the present case there is another reason why a court would be slow to go beyond the plain or literal meaning of the Family Law Act. The Family Law Act is a statute of Federal Parliament. There are good reasons why the Commonwealth would seek to limit the reach of the Federal Act into the jurisdiction of State courts. Such a reach would have constitutional implications. I would be reluctant to interpret s 19N to extend its ambit into proceedings in the Children's Court of Western Australia without clear and express words being used by Parliament to achieve that purpose.

For these reasons, I hold that the Family Law Act 1975 has no application to the present case or, in language more suited to injunctive relief, the plaintiffs have failed to establish in this respect a serious question to be tried.
Support is also derived from Centacare Central Queensland v G and K (1998) FLC 92-821 which, inter alia, confirmed the correctness of Relationships Australia v Pasternak.
Relied upon the following case see comments below
In Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, the majority, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ said at 381 to 382:
"The primary object of statutory construction is to construe the relevant provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all the provisions of the statute: see Taylor v Public Service Board (NSW) (1976) 137 CLR 208 at 213, per Barwick CJ. The meaning of the provision must be determined 'by reference to the language of the instrument viewed as a whole': Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 297 at 320, per Mason and Wilson JJ. See also South West Water Authority v Rumble's [1985] AC 609 at 617, per Lord Scarman, 'in the context of the legislation read as a whole'. In Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Agalianos (1955) 92 CLR 390 at 397, Dixon CJ pointed out that 'the context, the general purpose and policy of a provision and its consistency and fairness are surer guides to its meaning than the logic with which it is constructed'. Thus, the process of construction must always begin by examining the context of the provision that is being construed: Toronto Suburban Railway Co v Toronto Corporation [1915] AC 590 at 597; Minister for Lands (NSW) v Jeremias (1917) 23 CLR 322 at 332; K & S Lake City Freighters Pty Ltd v Gordon & Gotch Ltd (1985) 157 CLR 309 at 312, per Gibbs CJ; at 315, per Mason J; at 321, per Deane J.
A legislative instrument must be construed on the prima facie basis that its provisions are intended to give effect to harmonious goals: Ross v The Queen (1979) 141 CLR 432 at 440, per Gibbs J. Where conflict appears to arise from the language of particular provisions, the conflict must be alleviated, so far as possible, by adjusting the meaning of the competing provisions to achieve that result which will best give effect to the purpose and language of those provisions while maintaining the unity of all the statutory provisions: see Australian Alliance Assurance Co Ltd v Attorney-General (Q) [1916] St R Qd 135 at 161, per Cooper CJ; Minister for Resources v Dover Fisheries Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 565 at 574, per Gummow J. Reconciling conflicting provisions will often require the court 'to determine which is the leading provision and which the subordinate provision, and which must give way to the other': Institute of Patent Agents v Lockwood [1894] AC 347 at 360, per Lord Herschell LC. Only by determining the hierarchy of the provisions will it be possible in many cases to give each provision the meaning which best gives effect to its purpose and language while maintaining the unity of the statutory scheme.
Furthermore, a court construing a statutory provision must strive to give meaning to every word of the provision: The Commonwealth v Baume (1905) 2 CLR 405 at 414, per Griffiths CJ; at 419, per O'Connor J; Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1 at 12-13, per Mason CJ. In The Commonwealth v Baume (supra) Griffith CJ cited R v Berchet (1688) 1 Show KB 106 [89 ER 480] to support the proposition that it was 'a known rule in the interpretation of Statues that such a sense is to be made upon the whole as that no clause, sentence, or word shall prove superfluous, void, or insignificant, if any other construction they may all be made useful and pertinent'."
Although the High Court's comments are made in respect of apparently conflicting provisions within one statute, the comments have general application to apparently conflicting provisions within different statutes both passed by the same Parliament.

Adapting those comments to the present case, I am of the view the Family Court Act s 64 conditions the directive to the Children's Court in the Child Welfare Act s 30 so as to exempt from admissibility, statements made in the course of counselling sessions with an authorised family and children's counsellor.

10J Admissibility of communications in family dispute resolution and in referrals from family dispute resolution

10J Admissibility of communications in family dispute resolution and in referrals from family dispute resolution
(1) Evidence of anything said, or any admission made, by or in the company of:
(a) a family dispute resolution practitioner conducting family dispute resolution; or
(b) a person (the professional) to whom a family dispute resolution practitioner refers a person for medical or other professional consultation, while the professional is carrying out professional services for the person;
is not admissible:
(c) in any court (whether or not exercising federal jurisdiction); or
(d) in any proceedings before a person authorised to hear evidence (whether the person is authorised by a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory, or by the consent of the parties).
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to:
(a) an admission by an adult that indicates that a child under 18 has been abused or is at risk of abuse; or
(b) a disclosure by a child under 18 that indicates that the child has been abused or is at risk of abuse;
unless, in the opinion of the court, there is sufficient evidence of the admission or disclosure available to the court from other sources.
(3) Subsection (1) does not apply to information necessary for the practitioner to give a certificate under subsection 60I(8).
(4) A family dispute resolution practitioner who refers a person to a professional (within the meaning of paragraph (1)(b)) must inform the professional of the effect of this section.

admissibility of statement made s.10J: Anglicare WA v Department of Family and Childrens

admissibility of statement made s.10J: Anglicare WA v Department of Family and Childrens
Services (2003)

Abuse allegations; Expert evidence and the opinion of the Full Court

In an article by Sperling J presented at the Supreme Court of New South Wales Annual Conference in 1999 and published as “Expert Evidence: The Problem of Bias and Other Things” (2000) 4 The Judicial Review 429, his Honour observed at 432:
“The actual role of the expert witness, particularly in major litigation, is that the expert is part of the team. He – it usually is a “he” – contributes to the way the case is framed and indirectly to decisions as to what evidence is to be got in to provide a basis for his opinion. His report is honed in consultation with counsel. Then, when it comes to the trial he is a front line soldier, carrying his side’s argument on the technical issues under the fire of cross-examination.Natural selection ensures that expert witnesses will serve the interests of their clients on this way. If the expert measures up he will be kept on and he will be used again by the same client, the same solicitors and others. If he does not measure up, he will be dropped from the case or never used again by anyone. He then disappears from the forensic scene.An appearance of objectivity is a marketable attribute. Cross-examination or contrary evidence may unmask dissemblance or may not. A judge is ill-equipped to diagnose bias in an expert witness. It is likely, therefore, that the incidence of bias as assessed by surveyed judges in the Freckelton report is an under-estimate.Judges are interested in valid fact-finding. So long as the adversarial system continues unremittingly, however, the interests of litigants in presenting expert evidence that may win the case will prevail over the interests of judges in obtaining objective assistance on technical issues as a basis for valid fact finding.”

We are of the opinion that the case highlights the need for reform in the area of expert evidence. In this regard, we note that the previously cited article by Sperling J offers a number of recommendations which we see as applicable to the family law jurisdiction, such as:
•
Promulgating a code of conduct for expert witnesses;
•
Consideration of amending statutes to make breach of a duty of objectivity professional misconduct;
•
Greater use of the power to refer out technical issues for determination by an expert referee; and
•
Amendments to the Rules of Court in respect of matters such as an express power to limit expert evidence to that of a single expert selected by the parties or the Court in appropriate cases.

Re W and W : (Abuse allegations; Expert evidence] [2001] FamCA 216 (14 March 2001)

Re W and W : (Abuse allegations; Expert evidence] [2001] FamCA 216 (14 March 2001)

In Re W and W: (Abuse Allegations; Expert Evidence) [2001] Faro CA 216 the Full Court of the Family Court (constituted by Nicholson CJ, O'Ryan and Kay JJ) heard an appeal from the decision of Barlow J that: * three daughters of a marriage, T aged 12, S aged 10 and O aged 6, should reside with the husband; * the husband should have sole responsibility for the day-to-day and long-term decisions concerning the care, welfare and development of the children; and * the children should have contact with the wife each Sunday under supervision from a professional service. The wife appealed against all three orders. The Evidence at Trial The wife had been the major care-giver to the children since 1988 when the oldest, T, had been born. A number of physical and mental health issues were the subject of evidence, particularly in relation to the wife. Between 1991 and 1992 the wife suffered 'in acute form' from chronic fatigue syndrome and then had a recurrence in 1993 after a period of depression in 1992. T experienced a number of difficulties at school and was seen by a psychologist in 1994. The wife and the husband commenced to attend marriage guidance counselling and in 1997 the wife began to develop an interest in 'New Age' beliefs, including undertaking a course in reiki. The object of the course was to train participants in the transference of reiki of 'universal energy' by opening people's 'crown chakra'. She became interested in 'channelling' which she described in an affidavit as 'a process whereby a medium allows another entity to channel energy and to speak through the medium'. She became convinced she could communicate with spirits and past lives. She did not hear or converse with them but experienced interaction with them as an 'inner feeling'. She regarded her daughter T as a medium and informed her sister that T was 'able in the most natural way, to hear and to see and to have dialogue with the spirit world'. She acknowledged that in 1997 and 1998 she became 'absolutely immersed in spiritual matters'. She agreed in evidence that some of the beliefs that she held during this period could be described as 'bizarre' and that during the 1997-1998 period she was living in a fantasy world. In 1998 the wife stated in documentation for the Family Court: As a result of my own development, my eldest child [T] has started accessing deeper levels of knowledge and is sharing it with me. Although all but nine years of age, she is of great influence to me, and is a great teacher. She has by far had the most influence on my metaphysical interest. In the beginning of 1997, my eldest daughter told me that my mission in life is 'to learn to speak to my Inner-Self and teach the same to others' also, 'to show the world that in reality there is only One God'. I believe and trust (or rather KNOW) that this training will assist me to achieve these goals (at [24]). During the same year the husband permitted the wife to perform reiki or spiritual healing on him, although he did not believe in it, but said that he enjoyed it as 'somewhat relaxing'. In late 1998 further attempts were made by the husband to obtain family counselling. Around the same time the wife complained to T's teacher that T was being emotionally and sexually abused by the husband. The teacher drew the conversation to the attention of the principal who made a formal notification to the Department of Family and Children Services ('the Department'). A further allegation was made around the same time that the husband had exposed himself to T and S with an erect penis. Generally, the wife alleged that the husband had engaged in inappropriate sexualised behaviour. At one point she maintained the T had alleged to her that her father had touched her 'everywhere' and had wanted to accompany her into the shower. However, the wife left the children in the care of the husband while she attended a further course in relation to her new age beliefs. The husband departed the matrimonial home and consulted a Relationships Australia counsellor who then, of his own volition, made a notification to the Department after the husband made admissions of inappropriate behaviour with T. Toward the end of the year the wife maintained that T made detailed disclosures of her breasts being touched by her father and her vagina being digitally penetrated by him on many occasions over several years. When T was interviewed by officers of the Department at the end of 1998 she alleged that she had been abused by: * the husband; * the husband's parents; and * an uncle. She also alleged that the husband had abused her younger sister, S. Around the same time the wife was hospitalised for depression. The husband was charged with a number of criminal offences but T's evidence at his trial in the District Court of Western Australia was erratic, major discrepancies emerging between what she said in examination-in-chief and re-examination, on the one hand, and cross-examination, on the other hand. However, evidence was given to the Family Court that T was subjected to wide-ranging attacks during cross-examination that she found very distressing. The prosecution filed a nolle prosequi and the prosecution was terminated. Nicholson CJ and O'Ryan J concluded that the evidence of a support person for T supported the view that it was the nature of the cross-examination that produced a negative reaction from the child and not any consciousness on her part that she had been caught out in telling lies. We have no doubt that the giving of evidence against a father in proceedings such as this would constitute a traumatic experience for any child and the traumatic nature of the experience could only be exacerbated by a searching cross-examination (at [72]-[73]). The Expert Evidence at Trial Dr Lord, a court-appointed psychiatrist, provided a report to the court and also gave evidence. Dr Lord gave weight to the fact that there was a document on the Departmental file in which the husband had disclosed unusual, if not aberrant, sexual behaviours. He noted that the husband denied that he had sexually assaulted T but that T had made multiple allegations against him, albeit somewhat inconsistently, in the District Court prosecution of the husband. He gave substantial evidence about his interviews with T. He was able to establish limited rapport with T, especially when he spoke with her about issues of good and bad touching--'She could not be encouraged to talk about private parts. [T] made no disclosure of inappropriate touching of sexual assault. [T] did not appear to be distressed. Her attitude was of distance and detachment' (at [131]). He concluded that T seemed angry with both parents and behaved in his presence in defiant and challenging ways--'it was impossible to make any sense of the child's behaviour especially in the absence of any indication of apprehension, sadness of distress' (at [133]). He observed T in the presence of her father. She was reserved and sat next to him, interacting animatedly and apparently comfortably with him. Her conduct was similar to that of her younger sisters. Dr Lord concluded: Whilst [T] had every opportunity to confirm her previous disclosures as to sexual abuse as perpetrated by her father and other relatives, she chose not to do this. It is possible that the withdrawal of [T] into herself, at times, and her challenging and somewhat defiance (sic) stand at other times reflected an unwillingness to reconsider traumatic experiences. It is also possible, though, that the child's responses were consistent with those of an individual unwilling to acknowledge the discovery of fabrication. The possibility of fabrication may also assist understanding of the apparent anger directed by [T] towards mother and the enjoyment clearly demonstrated by the child in interactions with father. Nicholson CJ and O'Ryan J were not inclined to read much into the reactions of T to the interviews by Dr Lord. They observed that she had already been subjected to Departmental and police interviews, as well as a searching and unpleasant experience in the witness box--'With all respect to Dr Lord, we feel that his interviews at this stage bordered upon institutional abuse of the child insofar as they sought to investigate her allegations. He can hardly be criticised for this however as he had been appointed by the Court to do so' (at [140]). Dr Dixon, a psychiatrist, was called on behalf of the wife. He treated her in therapy and had not seen the husband or T. He was unable to identify a connection between the wife's New Age beliefs and T's allegations. He rejected as 'preposterous' that the children should be removed from their mother. Barlow J did not accord any significant weight to his evidence on the basis of the absence of professional detachment from his patient, particularly in light of changes he made to his report after consultation with the wife. Dr W, a New South Wales child psychiatrist, was called on behalf of the husband. Dr W expressed the view that there was a serious risk that any form of contact between the wife and the children due to her new age beliefs.

As to the evidence of Dr W, we are of the opinion that Dr W demonstrated bias and thus little, if any weight, should have been attached to his opinion. In our view, he stepped out of the role of an expert witness and assumed the role of advocate.

It follows in our view that the trial Judge’s decision must be set aside.

We are of the opinion that the case highlights the need for reform in the area of expert evidence. In this regard, we note that the previously cited article by Sperling J offers a number of recommendations which we see as applicable to the family law jurisdiction, such as:
• Promulgating a code of conduct for expert witnesses;
• Consideration of amending statutes to make breach of a duty of objectivity professional misconduct;
• Greater use of the power to refer out technical issues for determination by an expert referee; and
• Amendments to the Rules of Court in respect of matters such as an express power to limit expert evidence to that of a single expert selected by the parties or the Court in appropriate cases.
We think that there is considerable merit in these proposals. We note that some have been adopted by changes to the Rules of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (see Bill Madden “Changes to the role of the expert witness” (2000) 38 (5) Law Society Journal 50) and that the last one is also favoured by the Family Court of Australia’s Future Directions Committee Report which was published in July 2000 (see http://www.familycourt.gov.au/court/html/future_summary.html).

10H Confidentiality of communications in family dispute resolution

10H Confidentiality of communications in family dispute resolution
(1) A family dispute resolution practitioner must not disclose a communication made to the practitioner while the practitioner is conducting family dispute resolution, unless the disclosure is required or authorised by this section.
(2) A family dispute resolution practitioner must disclose a communication if the practitioner reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary for the purpose of complying with a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory.
(3) A family dispute resolution practitioner may disclose a communication if consent to the disclosure is given by:
(a) if the person who made the communication is 18 or over—that person; or
(b) if the person who made the communication is a child under 18:
(i) each person who has parental responsibility (within the meaning of Part VII) for the child; or
(ii) a court.
(4) A family dispute resolution practitioner may disclose a communication if the practitioner reasonably believes that the disclosure is necessary for the purpose of:
(a) protecting a child from the risk of harm (whether physical or psychological); or
(b) preventing or lessening a serious and imminent threat to the life or health of a person; or
(c) reporting the commission, or preventing the likely commission, of an offence involving violence or a threat of violence to a person; or
(d) preventing or lessening a serious and imminent threat to the property of a person; or
(e) reporting the commission, or preventing the likely commission, of an offence involving intentional damage to property of a person or a threat of damage to property; or
(f) if a lawyer independently represents a child’s interests under an order under section 68L—assisting the lawyer to do so properly.
(5) A family dispute resolution practitioner may disclose a communication in order to provide information (other than personal information within the meaning of section 6 of the Privacy Act 1988) for research relevant to families.
(6) A family dispute resolution practitioner may disclose information necessary for the practitioner to give a certificate under subsection 60I(8).
(7) Evidence that would be inadmissible because of section 10J is not admissible merely because this section requires or authorises its disclosure.
Note: This means that the practitioner’s evidence is inadmissible in court, even if subsection (2), (3), (4), (5) or (6) allows the practitioner to disclose it in other circumstances.
(8) In this section:
communication includes admission.

10P Immunity of arbitrators

10P Immunity of arbitrators
An arbitrator has, in performing his or her functions as an arbitrator, the same protection and immunity as a Judge of the Family Court has in performing the functions of a Judge.
Note: Communications with arbitrators are not confidential, and may be admissible in court.

10N Arbitrators may charge fees for their services

10N Arbitrators may charge fees for their services
(1) An arbitrator conducting arbitration may charge the parties to the arbitration fees for conducting it.
(2) The arbitrator must give written information about those fees to the parties before the arbitration starts.
Note: There may be Rules of Court or regulations relating to the costs of arbitration and how they are assessed or taxed (see paragraphs 123(1)(se) and 125(1)(bc)).

10M Definition of arbitrator

10M Definition of arbitrator
An arbitrator is a person who meets the requirements prescribed in the regulations to be an arbitrator.

10L Definition of arbitration

10L Definition of arbitration
(1) Arbitration is a process (other than the judicial process) in which parties to a dispute present arguments and evidence to an arbitrator, who makes a determination to resolve the dispute.
(2) Arbitration may be either:
(a) section 13E arbitration—which is arbitration of Part VIII proceedings carried out as a result of an order made under section 13E; or
(b) relevant property or financial arbitration—which is arbitration (other than section 13E arbitration) of:
(i) Part VIII proceedings, Part VIIIA proceedings, Part VIIIB proceedings or section 106A proceedings; or
(ii) any part of such proceedings; or
(iii) any matter arising in such proceedings; or
(iv) a dispute about a matter with respect to which such proceedings could be instituted.

60I Attending family dispute resolution before applying for Part VII order

60I Attending family dispute resolution before applying for Part VII order
Object of this section
(1) The object of this section is to ensure that all persons who have a dispute about matters that may be dealt with by an order under this Part (a Part VII order) make a genuine effort to resolve that dispute by family dispute resolution before the Part VII order is applied for.
Phase 1 (from commencement to 30 June 2007)
(2) The dispute resolution provisions of the Family Law Rules 2004 impose the requirements for dispute resolution that must be complied with before an application is made to the Family Court of Australia for a parenting order.
(3) By force of this subsection, the dispute resolution provisions of the Family Law Rules 2004 also apply to an application to a court (other than the Family Court of Australia) for a parenting order. Those provisions apply to the application with such modifications as are necessary.
(4) Subsection (3) applies to an application for a parenting order if the application is made:
(a) on or after the commencement of this section; and
(b) before 1 July 2007.
Phase 2 (from 1 July 2007 to first proclaimed date)
(5) Subsections (7) to (12) apply to an application for a Part VII order in relation to a child if:
(a) the application is made on or after 1 July 2007 and before the date fixed by Proclamation for the purposes of this paragraph; and
(b) none of the parties to the proceedings on the application has applied, before 1 July 2007, for a Part VII order in relation to the child.
Phase 3 (from second proclaimed date)
(6) Subsections (7) to (12) apply to all applications for a Part VII order in relation to a child that are made on or after the date fixed by Proclamation for the purposes of this subsection.
Requirement to attempt to resolve dispute by family dispute resolution before applying for a parenting order
(7) Subject to subsection (9), a court exercising jurisdiction under this Act must not hear an application for a Part VII order in relation to a child unless the applicant files in the court a certificate given to the applicant by a family dispute resolution practitioner under subsection (8). The certificate must be filed with the application for the Part VII order.
Certificate by family dispute resolution practitioner
(8) A family dispute resolution practitioner may give one of these kinds of certificates to a person:
(a) a certificate to the effect that the person did not attend family dispute resolution with the practitioner and the other party or parties to the proceedings in relation to the issue or issues that the order would deal with, but the person’s failure to do so was due to the refusal, or the failure, of the other party or parties to the proceedings to attend;
(aa) a certificate to the effect that the person did not attend family dispute resolution with the practitioner and the other party or parties to the proceedings in relation to the issue or issues that the order would deal with, because the practitioner considers, having regard to the matters prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this paragraph, that it would not be appropriate to conduct the proposed family dispute resolution;
(b) a certificate to the effect that the person attended family dispute resolution with the practitioner and the other party or parties to the proceedings in relation to the issue or issues that the order would deal with, and that all attendees made a genuine effort to resolve the issue or issues;
(c) a certificate to the effect that the person attended family dispute resolution with the practitioner and the other party or parties to the proceedings in relation to the issue or issues that the order would deal with, but that the person, the other party or another of the parties did not make a genuine effort to resolve the issue or issues.
Note: When an applicant files one of these certificates under subsection (7), the court may take the kind of certificate into account in considering whether to make an order referring to parties to family dispute resolution (see section 13C) and in determining whether to award costs against a party (see section 117).
Exception
(9) Subsection (7) does not apply to an application for a Part VII order in relation to a child if:
(a) the applicant is applying for the order:
(i) to be made with the consent of all the parties to the proceedings; or
(ii) in response to an application that another party to the proceedings has made for a Part VII order; or
(b) the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that:
(i) there has been abuse of the child by one of the parties to the proceedings; or
(ii) there would be a risk of abuse of the child if there were to be a delay in applying for the order; or
(iii) there has been family violence by one of the parties to the proceedings; or
(iv) there is a risk of family violence by one of the parties to the proceedings; or
(c) all the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) the application is made in relation to a particular issue;
(ii) a Part VII order has been made in relation to that issue within the period of 12 months before the application is made;
(iii) the application is made in relation to a contravention of the order by a person;
(iv) the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has behaved in a way that shows a serious disregard for his or her obligations under the order; or
(d) the application is made in circumstances of urgency; or
(e) one or more of the parties to the proceedings is unable to participate effectively in family dispute resolution (whether because of an incapacity of some kind, physical remoteness from dispute resolution services or for some other reason); or
(f) other circumstances specified in the regulations are satisfied.
Referral to family dispute resolution when exception applies
(10) If:
(a) a person applies for a Part VII order; and
(b) the person does not, before applying for the order, attend family dispute resolution with a family dispute resolution practitioner and the other party or parties to the proceedings in relation to the issue or issues that the order would deal with; and
(c) subsection (7) does not apply to the application because of subsection (9);
the court must consider making an order that the person attend family dispute resolution with a family dispute resolution practitioner and the other party or parties to the proceedings in relation to that issue or those issues.
(11) The validity of:
(a) proceedings on an application for a Part VII order; or
(b) any order made in those proceedings;
is not affected by a failure to comply with subsection (7) in relation to those proceedings.
(12) In this section:
dispute resolution provisions of the Family Law Rules 2004 means:
(a) Rule 1.05 of those Rules; and
(b) Part 2 of Schedule 1 to those Rules;
to the extent to which they deal with dispute resolution.

10K Family dispute resolution practitioners must comply with regulations

10K Family dispute resolution practitioners must comply with regulations
(1) The regulations may prescribe requirements to be complied with by family dispute resolution practitioners in relation to the family dispute resolution services they provide.
(2) The regulations may prescribe penalties not exceeding 10 penalty units in respect of offences against regulations made for the purposes of subsection (1).

10J Admissibility of communications in family dispute resolution and in referrals from family dispute resolution

10J Admissibility of communications in family dispute resolution and in referrals from family dispute resolution
(1) Evidence of anything said, or any admission made, by or in the company of:
(a) a family dispute resolution practitioner conducting family dispute resolution; or
(b) a person (the professional) to whom a family dispute resolution practitioner refers a person for medical or other professional consultation, while the professional is carrying out professional services for the person;
is not admissible:
(c) in any court (whether or not exercising federal jurisdiction); or
(d) in any proceedings before a person authorised to hear evidence (whether the person is authorised by a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory, or by the consent of the parties).
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to:
(a) an admission by an adult that indicates that a child under 18 has been abused or is at risk of abuse; or
(b) a disclosure by a child under 18 that indicates that the child has been abused or is at risk of abuse;
unless, in the opinion of the court, there is sufficient evidence of the admission or disclosure available to the court from other sources.
(3) Subsection (1) does not apply to information necessary for the practitioner to give a certificate under subsection 60I(8).
(4) A family dispute resolution practitioner who refers a person to a professional (within the meaning of paragraph (1)(b)) must inform the professional of the effect of this section.

10H Confidentiality of communications in family dispute resolution

10H Confidentiality of communications in family dispute resolution
(1) A family dispute resolution practitioner must not disclose a communication made to the practitioner while the practitioner is conducting family dispute resolution, unless the disclosure is required or authorised by this section.
(2) A family dispute resolution practitioner must disclose a communication if the practitioner reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary for the purpose of complying with a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory.
(3) A family dispute resolution practitioner may disclose a communication if consent to the disclosure is given by:
(a) if the person who made the communication is 18 or over—that person; or
(b) if the person who made the communication is a child under 18:
(i) each person who has parental responsibility (within the meaning of Part VII) for the child; or
(ii) a court.
(4) A family dispute resolution practitioner may disclose a communication if the practitioner reasonably believes that the disclosure is necessary for the purpose of:
(a) protecting a child from the risk of harm (whether physical or psychological); or
(b) preventing or lessening a serious and imminent threat to the life or health of a person; or
(c) reporting the commission, or preventing the likely commission, of an offence involving violence or a threat of violence to a person; or
(d) preventing or lessening a serious and imminent threat to the property of a person; or
(e) reporting the commission, or preventing the likely commission, of an offence involving intentional damage to property of a person or a threat of damage to property; or
(f) if a lawyer independently represents a child’s interests under an order under section 68L—assisting the lawyer to do so properly.
(5) A family dispute resolution practitioner may disclose a communication in order to provide information (other than personal information within the meaning of section 6 of the Privacy Act 1988) for research relevant to families.
(6) A family dispute resolution practitioner may disclose information necessary for the practitioner to give a certificate under subsection 60I(8).
(7) Evidence that would be inadmissible because of section 10J is not admissible merely because this section requires or authorises its disclosure.
Note: This means that the practitioner’s evidence is inadmissible in court, even if subsection (2), (3), (4), (5) or (6) allows the practitioner to disclose it in other circumstances.
(8) In this section:
communication includes admission.

10G Definition of family dispute resolution practitioner

10G Definition of family dispute resolution practitioner
(1) A family dispute resolution practitioner is:
(a) a person who is accredited as a family dispute resolution practitioner under the Accreditation Rules; or
(b) a person who is authorised to act on behalf of an organisation designated by the Minister for the purposes of this paragraph; or
(c) a person who is authorised to act under section 38BD, or engaged under subsection 38R(1A), as a family dispute resolution practitioner; or
(d) a person who is authorised to act under section 93D of the Federal Magistrates Act 1999, or engaged under subsection 115(1A) of that Act, as a family dispute resolution practitioner; or
(e) a person who is authorised by a Family Court of a State to act as a family dispute resolution practitioner.
(2) The Minister must publish, at least annually, a list of organisations designated for the purposes of paragraph (b) of the definition of family dispute resolution practitioner.
(3) An instrument under this section is not a legislative instrument.
10H Confidentiality of communications in family dispute resolution
(1) A family dispute resolution practitioner must not disclose a communication made to the practitioner while the practitioner is conducting family dispute resolution, unless the disclosure is required or authorised by this section.
(2) A family dispute resolution practitioner must disclose a communication if the practitioner reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary for the purpose of complying with a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory.
(3) A family dispute resolution practitioner may disclose a communication if consent to the disclosure is given by:
(a) if the person who made the communication is 18 or over—that person; or
(b) if the person who made the communication is a child under 18:
(i) each person who has parental responsibility (within the meaning of Part VII) for the child; or
(ii) a court.
(4) A family dispute resolution practitioner may disclose a communication if the practitioner reasonably believes that the disclosure is necessary for the purpose of:
(a) protecting a child from the risk of harm (whether physical or psychological); or
(b) preventing or lessening a serious and imminent threat to the life or health of a person; or
(c) reporting the commission, or preventing the likely commission, of an offence involving violence or a threat of violence to a person; or
(d) preventing or lessening a serious and imminent threat to the property of a person; or
(e) reporting the commission, or preventing the likely commission, of an offence involving intentional damage to property of a person or a threat of damage to property; or
(f) if a lawyer independently represents a child’s interests under an order under section 68L—assisting the lawyer to do so properly.
(5) A family dispute resolution practitioner may disclose a communication in order to provide information (other than personal information within the meaning of section 6 of the Privacy Act 1988) for research relevant to families.
(6) A family dispute resolution practitioner may disclose information necessary for the practitioner to give a certificate under subsection 60I(8).
(7) Evidence that would be inadmissible because of section 10J is not admissible merely because this section requires or authorises its disclosure.
Note: This means that the practitioner’s evidence is inadmissible in court, even if subsection (2), (3), (4), (5) or (6) allows the practitioner to disclose it in other circumstances.
(8) In this section:
communication includes admission.

10F Definition of family dispute resolution
Family dispute resolution is a process (other than a judicial process):
(a) in which a family dispute resolution practitioner helps people affected, or likely to be affected, by separation or divorce to resolve some or all of their disputes with each other; and
(b) in which the practitioner is independent of all of the parties involved in the process.

65F General requirements for counselling before parenting order made

65F General requirements for counselling before parenting order made
(2) Subject to subsection (3), a court must not make a parenting order in relation to a child unless:
(a) the parties to the proceedings have attended family counselling to discuss the matter to which the proceedings relate; or
(b) the court is satisfied that there is an urgent need for the parenting order, or there is some other special circumstance (such as family violence), that makes it appropriate to make the order even though the parties to the proceedings have not attended a conference as mentioned in paragraph (a); or
(c) the court is satisfied that it is not practicable to require the parties to the proceedings to attend a conference as mentioned in paragraph (a).
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply to the making of a parenting order if:
(a) it is made with the consent of all the parties to the proceedings; or
(b) it is an order until further order.
(4) In this section:
proceedings for a parenting order includes:
(a) proceedings for the enforcement of a parenting order; and
(b) any other proceedings in which a contravention of a parenting order is alleged.

10E Admissibility of communications in family counselling and in referrals from family counselling

10E Admissibility of communications in family counselling and in referrals from family counselling
(1) Evidence of anything said, or any admission made, by or in the company of:
(a) a family counsellor conducting family counselling; or
(b) a person (the professional) to whom a family counsellor refers a person for medical or other professional consultation, while the professional is carrying out professional services for the person;
is not admissible:
(c) in any court (whether or not exercising federal jurisdiction); or
(d) in any proceedings before a person authorised to hear evidence (whether the person is authorised by a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory, or by the consent of the parties).
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to:
(a) an admission by an adult that indicates that a child under 18 has been abused or is at risk of abuse; or
(b) a disclosure by a child under 18 that indicates that the child has been abused or is at risk of abuse;
unless, in the opinion of the court, there is sufficient evidence of the admission or disclosure available to the court from other sources.
(3) Nothing in this section prevents a family counsellor from disclosing information necessary for the counsellor to give a certificate of the kind mentioned in paragraph 16(2A)(a) of the Marriage Act 1961.
(4) A family counsellor who refers a person to a professional (within the meaning of paragraph (1)(b)) must inform the professional of the effect of this section.

10D Confidentiality of communications in family counselling

10D Confidentiality of communications in family counselling
(1) A family counsellor must not disclose a communication made to the counsellor while the counsellor is conducting family counselling, unless the disclosure is required or authorised by this section.
(2) A family counsellor must disclose a communication if the counsellor reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary for the purpose of complying with a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory.
(3) A family counsellor may disclose a communication if consent to the disclosure is given by:
(a) if the person who made the communication is 18 or over—that person; or
(b) if the person who made the communication is a child under 18:
(i) each person who has parental responsibility (within the meaning of Part VII) for the child; or
(ii) a court.
(4) A family counsellor may disclose a communication if the counsellor reasonably believes that the disclosure is necessary for the purpose of:
(a) protecting a child from the risk of harm (whether physical or psychological); or
(b) preventing or lessening a serious and imminent threat to the life or health of a person; or
(c) reporting the commission, or preventing the likely commission, of an offence involving violence or a threat of violence to a person; or
(d) preventing or lessening a serious and imminent threat to the property of a person; or
(e) reporting the commission, or preventing the likely commission, of an offence involving intentional damage to property of a person or a threat of damage to property; or
(f) if a lawyer independently represents a child’s interests under an order under section 68L—assisting the lawyer to do so properly.
(5) A family counsellor may disclose a communication in order to provide information (other than personal information within the meaning of section 6 of the Privacy Act 1988) for research relevant to families.
(6) Evidence that would be inadmissible because of section 10E is not admissible merely because this section requires or authorises its disclosure.
Note: This means that the counsellor’s evidence is inadmissible in court, even if subsection (2), (3), (4) or (5) allows the counsellor to disclose it in other circumstances.
(7) Nothing in this section prevents a family counsellor from disclosing information necessary for the counsellor to give a certificate of the kind mentioned in paragraph 16(2A)(a) of the Marriage Act 1961.
(8) In this section:
communication includes admission.

10C Definition of family counsellor

10C Definition of family counsellor
(1) A family counsellor is:
(a) a person who is accredited as a family counsellor under the Accreditation Rules; or
(b) a person who is authorised to act on behalf of an organisation designated by the Minister for the purposes of this paragraph; or
(c) a person who is authorised to act under section 38BD, or engaged under subsection 38R(1A), as a family counsellor; or
(d) a person who is authorised to act under section 93D of the Federal Magistrates Act 1999, or engaged under subsection 115(1A) of that Act, as a family counsellor; or
(e) a person who is authorised by a Family Court of a State to act as a family counsellor.
(2) The Minister must publish, at least annually, a list of organisations designated for the purposes of paragraph (b) of the definition of family counsellor.
(3) An instrument under this section is not a legislative instrument.

10B Definition of family counselling

10B Definition of family counselling
Family counselling is a process in which a family counsellor helps:
(a) one or more persons to deal with personal and interpersonal issues in relation to marriage; or
(b) one or more persons (including children) who are affected, or likely to be affected, by separation or divorce to deal with either or both of the following:
(i) personal and interpersonal issues;
(ii) issues relating to the care of children.

10B Definition of family counselling

10B Definition of family counselling
Family counselling is a process in which a family counsellor helps:
(a) one or more persons to deal with personal and interpersonal issues in relation to marriage; or
(b) one or more persons (including children) who are affected, or likely to be affected, by separation or divorce to deal with either or both of the following:
(i) personal and interpersonal issues;
(ii) issues relating to the care of children.

counselling ss.10B-E; s.65F

role of Family Relationship Centres and issue of certificates after 1 July 2007

12E FLA Obligations on legal practitioners

12E Obligations on legal practitioners
(1) A legal practitioner who is consulted by a person considering instituting proceedings under this Act must give the person documents containing the information prescribed under section 12B (about non‑court based family services and court’s processes and services).
(2) A legal practitioner who is consulted by, or who is representing, a married person who is a party to:
(a) proceedings for a divorce order in relation to the marriage; or
(b) financial or Part VII proceedings in relation to the marriage;
must give the person documents containing the information prescribed under section 12C (about reconciliation).
(3) A legal practitioner representing a party in proceedings under Part VII must give the party documents containing the information prescribed under section 12D (about Part VII proceedings).
Note: Section 63DA also imposes information‑giving obligations on legal practitioners dealing with people involved in Part VII proceedings.
(4) A legal practitioner does not have to comply with subsection (1), (2) or (3) if the practitioner has reasonable grounds to believe that the person has already been given documents containing the prescribed information mentioned in that subsection.
(5) A legal practitioner does not have to comply with subsection (2) if the practitioner considers that there is no reasonable possibility of a reconciliation between the parties to the marriage.

s63DA FLA Obligations of advisers

63DA Obligations of advisers
(1) If an adviser gives advice or assistance to people in relation to parental responsibility for a child following the breakdown of the relationship between those people, the adviser must:
(a) inform them that they could consider entering into a parenting plan in relation to the child; and
(b) inform them about where they can get further assistance to develop a parenting plan and the content of the plan.
(2) If an adviser gives advice to people in connection with the making by those people of a parenting plan in relation to a child, the adviser must:
(a) inform them that, if the child spending equal time with each of them is:
(i) reasonably practicable; and
(ii) in the best interests of the child;
they could consider the option of an arrangement of that kind; and
(b) inform them that, if the child spending equal time with each of them is not reasonably practicable or is not in the best interests of the child but the child spending substantial and significant time with each of them is:
(i) reasonably practicable; and
(ii) in the best interests of the child;
they could consider the option of an arrangement of that kind; and
(c) inform them that decisions made in developing parenting plans should be made in the best interests of the child; and
(d) inform them of the matters that may be dealt with in a parenting plan in accordance with subsection 63C(2); and
(e) inform them that, if there is a parenting order in force in relation to the child, the order may (because of section 64D) include a provision that the order is subject to a parenting plan they enter into; and
(f) inform them about the desirability of including in the plan:
(i) if they are to share parental responsibility for the child under the plan—provisions of the kind referred to in paragraph 63C(2)(d) (which deals with the form of consultations between the parties to the plan) as a way of avoiding future conflicts over, or misunderstandings about, the matters covered by that paragraph; and
(ii) provisions of the kind referred to in paragraph 63C(2)(g) (which deals with the process for resolving disputes between the parties to the plan); and
(iii) provisions of the kind referred to in paragraph 63C(2)(h) (which deals with the process for changing the plan to take account of the changing needs or circumstances of the child or the parties to the plan); and
(g) explain to them, in language they are likely to readily understand, the availability of programs to help people who experience difficulties in complying with a parenting plan; and
(h) inform them that section 65DAB requires the court to have regard to the terms of the most recent parenting plan in relation to the child when making a parenting order in relation to the child if it is in the best interests of the child to do so.
Note: Paragraphs (a) and (b) only require the adviser to inform the people that they could consider the option of the child spending equal time, or substantial and significant time, with each of them. The adviser may, but is not obliged to, advise them as to whether that option would be appropriate in their particular circumstances.
(3) For the purposes of paragraph (2)(b), a child will be taken to spend substantial and significant time with a parent only if:
(a) the time the child spends with the parent includes both:
(i) days that fall on weekends and holidays; and
(ii) days that do not fall on weekends or holidays; and
(b) the time the child spends with the parent allows the parent to be involved in:
(i) the child’s daily routine; and
(ii) occasions and events that are of particular significance to the child; and
(c) the time the child spends with the parent allows the child to be involved in occasions and events that are of special significance to the parent.
(4) Subsection (3) does not limit the other matters to which regard may be had in determining whether the time a child spends with a parent would be substantial and significant.
(5) In this section:
adviser means a person who is:
(a) a legal practitioner; or
(b) a family counsellor; or
(c) a family dispute resolution practitioner; or
(d) a family consultant.

Family Court re-action procedures as they apply in children’s matters

Dispute resolution role of Family Relationship Centres and issue of certificates after 1 July 2007 0obligations on legal practitioners



12E Obligations on legal practitioners
(1) A legal practitioner who is consulted by a person considering instituting proceedings under this Act must give the person documents containing the information prescribed under section 12B (about non‑court based family services and court’s processes and services).
(2) A legal practitioner who is consulted by, or who is representing, a married person who is a party to:
(a) proceedings for a divorce order in relation to the marriage; or
(b) financial or Part VII proceedings in relation to the marriage;
must give the person documents containing the information prescribed under section 12C (about reconciliation).
(3) A legal practitioner representing a party in proceedings under Part VII must give the party documents containing the information prescribed under section 12D (about Part VII proceedings).
Note: Section 63DA also imposes information‑giving obligations on legal practitioners dealing with people involved in Part VII proceedings.
(4) A legal practitioner does not have to comply with subsection (1), (2) or (3) if the practitioner has reasonable grounds to believe that the person has already been given documents containing the prescribed information mentioned in that subsection.
(5) A legal practitioner does not have to comply with subsection (2) if the practitioner considers that there is no reasonable possibility of a reconciliation between the parties to the marriage.

Children

Nullity

Requirements of a valid marriage, including capacity to marry, prohibited relationships, formal requirements and defective consent (fraud, duress, mistake)
- In Re Kevin (validity of marriage of transsexual) (2003) (FC)

Nullity, including grounds for nullity and consequences of nullity decrees.
- AK and NC (2004) (Capacity to consent to marry)

Nolan Family Law

Family Law

1. Divorce
2. Nullity
3. Children
4. § admissibility of statement made s.10J: Anglicare WA v Department of Family and Childrens
   Services (2003)
   § Family Law Act 1975, Part III - Primary Dispute Resolution
   3.3 Jurisdictional requirements and discretion as to exercise jurisdiction
   § B v B (Re Jurisdiction) (2003) (FC)
   Inappropriate forum test in context of children’s matter
   3.4 Rebuttable presumption of shared parental responsibility
   § Presumption of Equal Shared Parental Responsibility s.61DA
   § B & B: Family Law Reform Act 1995 (1997)
   § Meaning: s.61B; s.61C; s.61DA; s.65DAE; s.4 definition of ‘major long-term issues’
   § objects and underlying principles: s.60B; Re Nathan: limited contact consent orders (2001)
   3.5 Parenting orders
   § s.64B
   § types of parenting orders
   § parenting plans
   § best interests of children as paramount consideration: s.60CA; s.65AA
   § determining best interests and relevant factors: s.60CC (primary and additional
   considerations)
   § possible parties: s.65C, s.65G ; KAM v MJR; JIG Intervenor (1999)
   § effect of death on parenting orders: s.65K
   § relocation: AMS v AIF (1999) (HC); A v A: Relocation Approach (2000); U v U (2002) (HC);
   D and SV (2003); Bolitho and Cohen (2005); KB and TC (2005); s.4 definition of ‘major longterm
   issues’ re (e) changes to the child’s living arrangements which make it significantly more
   difficult for the child to spend time with the other parent
   - 12 -
   § Requirement for court’s sanction of Consent Orders: T and N (2003)
   3.6 Parenting order (live with)
   § s.60B(1), s.65DAA
   § Best interests of child as paramount consideration see sections above
   § relevant factors: s.60CC: primary and additional considerations:
   - best interests of child as paramount consideration
   - wishes of the child: principles as to how children’s wishes are weighed: H v W (1995); R
   and R: Children’s wishes, (2000)
   - evidence of child’s wishes: Reynolds v Reynolds (1973); s.100A; s.68F(2); Ahmad v
   Ahmad (1979); ZN and YN (2002)
   - relationship of child with parents and other persons:
   - effect of change in existing arrangements
   - parents’ attitude to child and to duties and responsibilities of parenthood
   - need to protect child from abuse
   - family violence and family violence orders
   - shared residence orders: H and H (2003)
   § practical issues:
   - family violence: s.68R: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Division 11; Patsalou (1995); A v A
   (1998); T and S (2001)
   - applicant’s physical and mental health
   - child’s health
   - proposals for accommodation
   - child’s physical care
   - sexual orientation: L & L (1983); Doyle (1992); A and J (1995)
   - religion: Paisio and Paisio (No 2) (1979); Morrison and Morrison (1995); H and H (2003)
   - aboriginality: B and R and the Separate Representative (1995); In re CP (1997)
   - splitting of siblings: Hayman (1976); In the marriage of H and H (1995)
   - "maternal factor": Gronow (1979)
   - "parental factor": Rice v Miller (1993)
   - short term versus long term effects
   - surrogacy: Re Evelyn (1998); Re Mark (2003)
   - occupancy of home
   - Kupai Osmasker adoption: Lara & Lara and Marley & Sharp (2004)
   § interim residence orders
   - principles in Cilento (1980); Cowling (1998); J v W (1999); Wilkie: unreported decision of
   Moore J. (2006)
   - 13 -
   § leave to adopt: s.60G
   3.7 Parenting orders (spend time with/communicate with)
   § meaning: s.64B(3); s.64B(1); s.64B(2)(b)&(e)
   § Court to consider equal time/ substantial and significant time s.65DAA
   § relevant principles:
   - Cotton and Cotton (1983)
   - B and B (1986)
   - R v F (1996)
   - KAM v MJR: JIG (Intervener) (1999)
   § practical issues:
   - s.68T
   - family violence: JG and BG (1994); Patsalou and Patsalou (1995) Part 7, Division 11
   - usual orders
   - effect of delay in hearing of application
   - mechanics of transportation and hand-over
   - restricted contact
   - supervised contact (s.65L); outside agencies: B and B (1993) in cases of abuse Re C and
   J (1996)
   - child sexual abuse M and M (1998); B and B (1998)
   - lesbian families and donor fathers: Re Patrick (2002); Re Mark:: an application relating to
   parental responsibilities (2003)
   - refusal of contact: limited circumstances where this might happen; the test of
   "unacceptable risk"; M and M (1988); N and S and Separate Representative (1995); A v A
   (1998); Re W (Sex abuse: standard of proof) (2004)
   - limits on court’s power to restrict parent: VR and RR (2002)
   school holiday contact: Fooks and Clark (2004)
   § sharing costs of contact: Craven (1976)
   § the lack of relationship between contact and child support
   3.8 Parenting orders (allocation of parental responsibility)
   § meaning s.64B(1); s.64B(2)(c),(d) &(i); s.68B(2 & 3); B and B Family Law Reform Act 1995
   (1997)
   § decisions about major long term issues: s.64B(3)
   § special requirements for consent orders: s.65G
   § s.4 definition of ‘major long-term issues’
   § usual issues (schooling, education, medical procedures, future employment prospects): Re G:
   Children’s Schooling (2000)
   § change of name: Chapman and Palmer (1978); Flanagan v Handcock (2001)
   - 14 -
   3.9 Section 62G reports, including
   § normal content of the report
   § admissibility of the report: Wardle (1990)
   § right to cross-examine author of report
   3.10 Enforcement of parenting orders
   § The parenting compliance provisions: Part VII, Division 13A; D and C (2004)
   § location and recovery orders (Part VII Division 8 Subdivision C)
   § role of the marshall of the court
   § Part VII Division 6 Subdivision C
   § applications involving third parties
   § provisions for disclosure
   3.11 Alteration of parenting orders: s.65D (2)
   § relevant principles Hayman (1976)
   § the precondition of fresh circumstances: changed circumstances; undisclosed material facts
   § the precondition as a preliminary issue Rice and Asplund (1979); Bennett (1991); King and
   Finneran (2001)
   3.12 Abduction of children
   § A and GS and MQ and Attorney-General and Commonwealth Central Authority (2004)
   (overruling Marriage of Panayotides (1996))
   § appropriate forum: ZP v PS Re ex parte ZP (1994); Karides v Wilson (1998)
   § recognition of overseas orders:
   - common law: McKee (1951); Khamis (1978); Barrios and Sanchez (1989)
   - effect and scope of Part VII Division 13
   - Hague Convention on the Civil Aspect of International Child Abduction of 1980; P and
   Commonwealth Central Authorities (2000)
   - Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1987: effect of regulations;
   convention countries; special circumstances, regulation 16(2) and 16(3); McCall & McCall;
   State Central Authority (Applications); A-G of Commonwealth (intervener) (1995); De L v
   D-G Department of Community Services (1996); DP v Commonwealth Central Authority
   (2001); JWB, RWS & MMS v Secretary, Attorney General’s Department (2005)
   § Offences: ss.65X - 65ZA
   § practical aspects:
   - watch lists procedure
   - carriers: ss.65ZA - 65ZC
   3.13 Paternity
   § presumptions: ss.69P - 69T; Re Mark [2003] FamCA 822
   - 15 -
   § testing (Part VII Division 12 Subdivision E): Re C (No 1) (1992); Re C (no 2) (1992); G v H
   (1994)
   § evidence and proof of paternity (Part VII Division 12 Subdivision E)
   § declaration of paternity
   § power to direct testing: s.69W
   § effect on child maintenance G and N (2003)
   § rebuttal s.69U
   § discussion: Walters FM in unreported judgement F&Z (2005) FMCA 394
   3.14 Representation of children
   § s.68L Part VII, Division 10
   § role of ICL: s.68LA and commentary, P and P (1995); B and R (1995)
   § general rights and obligations of ICL: s.68M and interviewing, Re P (A Child) (1993); Re K
   (1994) Guidelines for Child Representatives
   § the relationship of the ICL with the child, court counsellors and other parties
   § Cost of ICL: Re JJT & ors; ex parte Victorian Legal Aid (1998)
   § ICL case management guidelines
   3.15 Parenting plans
   § Part VII Division 4
   § Family Law Amendment Act 2003 (effective 14 January 2004)
   § Revocation or variation to parenting plans registered prior to 14 January 2004
   § Parenting Orders subject to later Parenting Plans, s.64D
   3.16 Court sanction of medical procedures
   § Marion’s Case (1991)
   § P v P (1994); P v P No 2 (1995)
   § Re A (a child) (1993)
   § Re Michael (1994)
   § Re Alex: Hormonal treatment for gender identity dysphoria (2004)
   § s.67ZC Orders relating to the welfare of children
   3.17 Children in detention
   § MIMIA v B (2004)
   § "Immigration and the Family Court the High Court speaks" (2004) 18 AJFL 193
   § s.67ZC
   3.18 Child abuse allegations
   § Pt VII Division 11 "Family Violence"
   - 16 -
   § s.4 definition
   § CF s.60B pre 2006 amendments
   § s.60CC(2)(b)
   § s.60K – s.67Z Form 4
   § s.61DA(2) presumption of equal shared parenting responsibility
   § admissibility of statements by children: DT v JT (1999)
   § Standard of proof Re: W (sexual abuse, standard of proof )(2004)
   § unfounded allegations: L v T (1999)
   § relationship to State Laws :Northern Territory v GPAO (1999)
   4 Spousal maintenance
   § establishing a claim:
   - threshold finding under s.72; lack of adequate support and capacity to pay: Eliades &
   Eliades (1981); Bevan & Bevan (1995); Mitchell and Mitchell (1995)
   - consideration of s.75(2) factors
   - consideration of s.74 - exercise of discretion
   § relationship between spousal maintenance and property orders
   - distinction between s.75(2) component of property orders and claim for maintenance
   - consideration of award of spousal maintenance in light of property orders: Clauson &
   Clauson (1995); Bevan & Bevan (1995); Mitchell & Mitchell (1995)
   § lump sum orders
   - power of court to make order: s.74
   - necessity to consider periodic maintenance first: Clauson & Clauson (1995)
   - caution to be exercised in making lump sum orders: Anast & Ananstospoulos (1982);
   Clauson & Clauson (1995); Vautin v Vautin (1998)
   § retrospective maintenance orders: Milankov (2002)
   § modification and variation of spousal maintenance orders
   - consideration of s.83
   - variation: Caska (1998)
   § orders for urgent maintenance
   - consideration of s.77: Malcolm (1977); Ashton (1982)
   § specification in orders re spousal maintenance purposes
   - s.77A requirements: Doig (1999)
   § cessation of spousal maintenance orders
   - s.82 - death: effect of re-marriage
   5 Child maintenance and child support
   - 17 -
   § child maintenance
   - use of published statistics: Mitchell (1995); Streets (1994); Coon v Cox (1994);
   - Mee and Ferguson (1986)
   - s.66C FLA – Primary duty to maintain children s.66C FLA
   - s.66E FLA – jurisdictional aspects
   - s.66L FLA – Adult Child Maintenance
   § child support
   - Jurisdiction - parents and child
   - application of the formula – Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth)
   - Review process
   - Child Support agreements (essential clauses) and requirements for acceptance including
   Social Security requirement
   - Family Court jurisdiction under the child support legislation
   - Child support Agreements (variation by Court): Bryant (1996); Bertuch and Lynch (1998)
   - Statutory grounds for review and departure: Gyselman (1992)
   - Stay orders and requirements
   - Urgent maintenance
   - proof of parentage
   - substitution orders
   - payer not to prioritise: Ganter v Grimshaw (1998)
   6 Financial agreements & existing section 87 agreements
   § Part VIII A, FLA
   - the validity and enforceability of financial agreements: s.90 KA
   - setting aside financial agreements
   - ASIC and Rich & Anor (2003)
   - Family Law Amendment Act 2003 (inc. amendment to definition of "matrimonial
   cause" para (eab); s.4A(1); s.90K(1)(aa))
   § revocation of existing Section 87 Agreements
   7 Property
   § Part VIII & Part VIII B of FLA, F.L. Rules 2004, FMC Rules 2001
   § Family Law Amendment Act 2003
   Four Step Approach to Determining Property (Hickey)
   1. Identifying and Valuing Property
   - duty of full disclosure of relevant financial circumstances
   - 18 -
   - non-disclosure: Tait (2000)
   - identify and value relevant property: Duff (1977); Warne (1982); Zorbas & Zorbas (1990)
   - long service leave: Bourke (1993); Gould (1996)
   - treating assets of company or trusts as assets of a party: Ashton (1986); Stein (1986);
   Davidson (1990); Harris (1991); BP & KS (2002); Foda (1997); Coventry & Coventry and
   Smith (2004)
   - interest in a partnership: Best (1993)
   2. Assessing Contributions of Parties
   - direct financial contributions
   - indirect financial contributions
   - financial contributions by or on behalf of a child of the marriage
   - non financial contributions
   - contributions to the welfare of the family
   - Court’s approach s.79(4)(a)-(c): Zyk (1995); Waters and Jurek (1995); McClay (1996);
   Mallett (1984)
   - relevance of contributions to assets: Shaw (1989)
   - special contributions or skills: Ferraro (1993); JEL and DDF (2001); Figgins (2002)
   - financial contributions in short marriages: McMahon (1995); Goodwin (1991)
   - post separation contributions: Williams (1984); Jacobson (1989); Mackie (1981); Spiteri
   (2005); Coghlan & Wilkinson (2005)
   - third party contributions (gifts, loans etc): Gosper (1987); Kessey (1994) cf third party
   contributions (to the welfare of the family ie. Child minding): AB and ZB (2003)
   - gifts and inheritances: Bonnici (1992); White (1995); De Angelis and De Angelis (2003)
   - expectation of an inheritance: Tulloch v. White (1995); G & G (2000)
   - interest in a partnership: Best (1993)
   - windfalls: Zyk (1995), Farmer v Bramley (2000)
   - vicissitudes of life: Vautin (1998)
   - accident verdicts: Holmes (1990); Zubcic (1995); Aleksovski (1996)
   - assessing and balancing contributions
   - global versus asset by asset approach: Cahill & Cahill (2006); Norbis (1986); Lenehan
   (1987); M & M (2006); Zyke (1995)
   - relevance of domestic violence: Kennon (1997); Rosati (1998)
   - waste: Kowaliw (1981); Townsend (1995); Brown v Green (1999)
   - contributions after separation: Jacobson (1989); Farmer v Bramley (2000)
   3. s.75(2) Factors
   Court’s approach to s.75(2) Fa
   - superannuation
   - 19 -
   - bankruptcy
   - assess future needs and financial resources and overall disparity of financial position:
   Collins and Collins (1990); Clauson (1995); Waters v Jurek (1995); Dickson (1999);
   Campbell v Kusky (1998)
   4. Just and Equitable Requirement
   - just & equitable – Mallett (1984); Hickey (2003); Russell (1999); Jel & DDF (2001)
   § interrelationship with maintenance orders: Waters and Jurek (1995)
   § section 77A
   § no fault? Soblusky (1976); Kennon (1997)
   § redundancy: Burke (1993)
   § adjournment of property proceedings: s.79(5)
   § superannuation: Family Law Act Part VIIIB
   - types of funds
   - superannuation being treated as "property" Coghlan (2005); Cahill & Cahill (2006); M &
   M (2006)
   - splitting orders; Wrigley & Wrigley (2004)
   - flagging orders
   - superannuation agreements
   - valuation
   - court – powers and obligations
   - obligations with respect to trustees - procedural fairness (90MZD)
   - options after a splitting order is made
   - consent declarations as to superannuation/valuation required: Hickey and Hickey (2003)
   - self managed funds
   § income tax, capital gains tax, stamp duty and GST:
   - Rothwell (1994); Rosati (1998); Campbell v Kuskey (1998)
   - Income Tax Assessment Act
   § stamp duty:
   - s.90: Gazzo (1981)
   § s.106B:
   - elements for section to apply: Davidson (No 2) (1994); Pflugradt (1981); Ivanovic (2000)
   - when discretion to set aside will be exercised
   - constitutionality: Gould (1993)
   § s.85A:
   - types of settlements affected
   - meaning of "nuptial": Knight (1987)
   - 20 -
   § execution of instruments under s.106A
   § effect of death on property proceedings:
   - s.79(8)
   - admissibility of evidence of deceased party
   - enforcement of orders after death: s.79(1A)
   - the effect on a joint tenancy of a property application and property orders
   - s.79A: Anderson (2000); Prowse (1995); Sandrk (1991); Rodhe (1984)
   - relationship between claims of spouses and claims of creditors:
   - general principles
   - Chemaisse (1990); Bailey (1990); Biltoft (1995)
   § effect of bankruptcy:
   - where respondent is bankrupt: Daniel v Daniel & Jones (2004)
   - where proposed applicant is bankrupt
   - Corke: Official Trustee (1994); Re Sabri (1997)
   - Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Mateo (2003)
   - Parianos v Meluish (Trustee) (2003)
   § Bankruptcy and Family Law Legislation Amendment Act 2005
   § rights of and against third parties:
   - Ascot Investments Pty Ltd and Harper (1981); Warby (2002); Family Law Amendment Act
   2003
   - Part VIIIAA FLA
   § obtaining financial information:
   - specific questions
   - discovery
   - third party discovery
   - subpoena: National Employers v Waind (1978) NSWLR; Sharpe and Dalton (1990);
   Epstein (1993); Hatton (2000); FLR 2004 part 15.3
   - notices to produce: FLR 2004, rule 15.76
   § principle of "full and frank disclosure":
   - Oriolo (1985)
   - Black and Kellner (1992)
   - Weir (1993)
   - Anderson (2000)
   § valuation:
   - Dah & Hull (1983)
   - Clauson (1995)
   - 21 -
   - Best & Best (1993)
   - Georgeson (1995)
   - Lenehan (1987)
   - Harrison (1996)
   § notional property
   - De Angelis and De Angelis (2003)
   8. Injunctions
   § substantive law: s.68(b); s.114(1); s.114(2); s.114(3); Part VIIIAA (commenced 17 December
   2004)
   § relevant principles (re: power and exercise of discretion):
   - general: Waugh (1999)
   - circumstances arising out of marital relationship: Tansell (1977); McCarney (1977); F &
   F (1989)
   - personal protection/non-molestation: Kemsley (1984); Plows (1979)
   - limits on the power to grant interlocutory injunctions in the context of section 79A
   proceedings: G & T (2004)
   § to restrain dealings in property:
   - personal rights v legal or equitable interests: Mullane (1983)
   - merits of claim and degree of danger of prejudice: Sieling (1979)
   - real danger of prejudice: Stowe (1981)
   - prejudice to third parties: Martiniello (1981)
   - ordinary business dealings: Martiniello (1981)
   - minimum restrictions imposed: Sieling (1979)
   - undertakings: Blueseas v Mitchell and McGillvray (1999)
   § injunctions and third parties:
   - Part VIIIAA FLA
   - injunctions which affect third parties: Dovey ex parte Ross (1979)
   - injunctions directly against third parties
   - sham/puppet/alter ego: Ascot Investments Pty Ltd (1981)
   - jurisdictional questions: Yunghanns v Yunghanns (1999)
   § injunctions binding third parties: s.90AF (commencing 17 December 2004)
   § exclusive use and occupation:
   - conduct: Rowe (1980)
   - balance of convenience: Davis (1983)
   - relevant matters to consider: Davis (1983); O’Dea (1980); Borzak (1979)
   - 22 -
   § ex parte applications:
   - Family Law Rules 2004 Part 5.3 Applications without notice:
   - real and urgent need to protect: Sieling (1979)
   - duty of full disclosure: Dean (1977); Stowe (1981)
   - preservation of Evidence: Anton Pillar Orders
   - Preservation of Property: Mareva Orders
   9 Procedures
   Relevant Rules, Regulations, Guidelines, practice Directions and Protocols including:
   § Family Court
   - Family Law Rules 2004
   - Case Management directions March 2004
   - Practice Directions including:
   - No. 2 of 2006 - Child related proceedings (Division 12A)
   - No. 2 of 2005 - Practice Direction for the Melbourne Implementation of the Children's
   Cases Program Incorporating the Child Responsive Pilot
   - No. 3 of 2005 - The National Children's Cases Program
   - No. 2 of 2004 - The Children's Cases Program
   - No. 3 of 2004 - Case Management Directions
   - No. 4 of 2004 - Filing of Discrete Applications Requiring Summary Determination
   - No. 6 of 2004 – Child sexual abuse and other physical abuse
   - No. 7 of 2004 - Appeals - Family Law Rules 2004
   - No. 8 of 2004 – Applications to the Court arising from traditional and customary
   adoption practices – Kupai Omasker
   - No. 6 of 2003 – Divorce applications to be filed in Federal Magistrates’ Court
   § Federal Magistrates Court
   - Federal Magistrates’ Court Rules 2001
   - Federal Magistrates’ Regulations 2000
   - Federal Magistrate Service Rules 2004
   § Procedures in both Courts including:
   - Philosophy of the Courts
   - Legal Practitioners responsibilities to the Courts
   - Jurisdiction
   - Counselling and mediation facilities available
   - Starting proceedings including urgent applications
   - Service
   - 23 -
   - Transfer of proceedings between Federal Magistrates Court and Family Court
   - Transferring a case to another Registry
   - Conduct of proceedings including seeking priority
   - Trial management
   - Consent Orders
   - Disclosure – obligations
   - Evidence
   - Subpoenas
   - Financial matters
   - Dissolution of marriage
   - Child support
   - Enforcement
   - Forms
   - Costs
   - Open offers
   - Adding and removing a party
   - Procedure for appeal
   § Family Court
   - Delegation of Powers of Judicial Registrars, Registrars and Deputy Registrars FLR 2004
   Chapter 18
   - Pre-Action Procedures
   - Directions Hearings, Case Assessment Conference, Trial Notice Listings, Conciliation
   Conferences, Pre-trial Conferences and Defaulters Lists
   - Associated, Accrued and Cross-vesting Law
   - Medical procedures
   - Appointment of case guardian
   - Court protocols with third parties e.g. Family Court and The Department of Human
   Services (this will need to be variable for each State’s relevant Department protocol)
   - Non-party production of documents
   - Orders and Injunctions Binding Third Parties (Part VIIIAA)
   - Expert evidence and use of single expert witness
   - Bankruptcy, third party debt notice, sequestration of property and receivership
   - Review of decisions of Registrars and Judicial registrars: Harris and Caladine (1990)
   - Exercise of Discretion on Appeal: Allesch and Maunz (2000); Wall (2002); Caska and
   Caska (No 3) (2004)
   - Counselling and mediation facilities available
   - 24 -
   - Self represented litigants: Re F: Litigants in Person Guidelines (2001); Kousal and Tack
   (2003)
   - Nullity rule: rule 11.02 FLR 2004
   - Application to dispense with compliance: rule 1.12 FLR 2004
   - Listing procedures (duty list requirements)
   - Judicial bias: Johnson v Johnson (2000); Re B (Alleged apprehension of Bias) (2004);
   Tratnik and Riordan & Partners (2004)
   - Summary Dismissal: Beck and Beck (2004)
   10 Evidence
   § relevant Legislation
   - Family Law Act 1975
   - Evidence Act (Commonwealth) 1995
   - Federal Magistrates Court Act
   § affidavit evidence – interim, procedural, and final proceedings: Miller, M and Miller, HD (2005)
   § oral evidence
   § expert evidence
   - single expert witnesses: chapter 15 Family Law Rules 2004
   - Family Court Rules
   - Court counsellors: Hall (1979); Ahmad (1979); Re Cook; Ex Parte Twigg (1980)
   - Other experts: Re W and W: Abuse Allegations: Expert Evidence (2001); Weatherall and
   Weatherall and Ors (2006)
   § fresh evidence on Appeal CDJ v VAJ (1998) (HC)
   § evidence of children
   - family report
   - statements by children
   - oral evidence: Todd and Todd (no 1) (1976); Barnett and Hocking (1983); Foley and Foley
   (1978)
   § protection of Witnesses
   § exclusion of matters disclosed during conciliation conference: Low & Harrington (1995) FLC;
   s.131 Evidence Act
   § Evidence Act (Commonwealth) 1995
   - witness – competence and compellability
   - relevance
   - hearsay
   - opinion
   - admissions
   - 25 -
   - privilege
   - documents and business records
   - rule in Browne v Dunne; LC v TC (1998)
   - unfavourable witnesses
   - Judicial Notice X v X (2000); A v A: Relocation Approach (2000)
   § statements by children
   § evidence in State Court proceedings
   § part VII, Division 12A s.69ZT
   §
   11 Enforcement
   § enforcement issues raised under heading "children"
   § maintenance Reid (1978)
   § contempt and quasi contempt: s.35; Part XIIIA:
   - principles and practice: Sahari (1976); Rutherford and Marshall of the Family Court of
   Australia (1999); K and J (2004); Tate and Tate (no 3) (2003); Mead and Mead (2006);
   Abduramanoska, D (2005)
   - standard of proof: Tate (2002)
   § Family Law Rules 2004: Chapter 20 Enforcement of financial orders and obligations; Collins,
   MH and Olsthoorn, QPW (2005); Barrak, B and Ors and Barakat, DM (2005); Samootin v
   Wagner and Anor (2006)
   § factors when exercising discretion
   § use of bankruptcy
   12 Costs
   § s.117: Penfold (1980)
   § Chapter 19 Costs: FLR 2004
   § contracting out with client: Barrett v Whitten (1992); McInnes v Twigg; Weiss v Barker Gosling
   (No. 1) (1993); Weiss v Barker Gosling (No. 2) (1994); Schiliro v Gadens Ridgeway (1995);
   Twigg & Twigg v Rutherford (1996)
   § legal aid: Telfer v Telfer (1996)
   § maintenance order to pay costs: Hogan (1986); Breen (1990)
   § interim costs: Barro (1983); Hogan (1986); Poletti (1990); Chester (1995); Szchokke (1996)
   § s.117C offers: Harris (1987); Kowalski v Kowalski (1994)
   § written offers of settlement
   § withdrawal of offer: Murray (1990); Kowalski v Kowalski (1994)
   § solicitor’s position in relationship to award obtained: Gadens Ridgeway v Paroulakis (1992);
   Twigg & Twigg v Ready (1996)
   § applicability of Family Law Scale to Family Court Proceedings: G and G (2004)
   - 26 -
   § case management guidelines
   § court’s power to order funding of separate representative: Re JJT (1998)
   § case management guidelines and practice directions re notification as to costs
   § costs orders against legal representatives: Anstis and Anstis and Hill, Doyle and Teague
   (1999); Yunghanns and Ors (2000)
   §
   13 Reviews/Appeals
   - appeals from Court of Summary Jurisdiction; Nature of Hearing de novo: Harris v Caladine
   (1991)
   - FMS appeals
   - appeals from Interlocutory Decree: Tudor (1992)
   - leave to appeal
   - appeals to the Full Court: Chapter 22 Family Law Rules
   - grounds of Appeal
   - fresh evidence: DCJ v VAJ (1998); Allesch v Maunz (2000); Wall (2002); Van Ballekom v
   Kelly (2005)
   - stays pending Appeal
   - summary dismissal: Derek (2006)
   - case stated
   14 Inherent, Associated and Accrued Jurisdiction
   § associated Jurisdiction
   § limited Statutory Jurisdiction: Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs and
   B (2004) (HC)
   § inherent: DJL v Central Authority (2000)
   § cross-vesting: R v Wakim; ex parte McNally (1999)
   § accrued: Warby (2002); Finlayson v Finlayson and Gillam (2002); Foley v Farquharso & Anor
   (2003); Bishop (2003)
   15 Miscellaneous Matters
   § constitutional framework of Family Law: Russell v Russell (1976)
   § ethics
   § family trusts and family maintenance trusts
   § domestic violence
   § duty of confidence Re Bell, Ex Parte Lees (1980); s.118 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)
   § conflicts of interest: Thevanez (1986); McGillivray v Mitchell (1998)
   § arbitration and the Family Law Regulations in relation to arbitration
   - 27 -
   CORE AREAS OF KNOWLEDGE
   Part B - Individual Jurisdictions (For Queensland participants only)
   § Relevant Child Welfare Matters
   § State Child Welfare Laws and Childrens Courts:
   - Relationship to Family Court Orders - Section 59ZK(FLA)
   - Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld)
   § Chapter 2 - Protection of Children
   § Part 7 - Children in need of care and control
   - Adoption of Children Act (1964)
   - Status of Children Act 1978 (Qld)
   § Domestic Violence (Family Protection Act) (1989) Queensland
   - Meaning of "Domestic Violence"
   - Persons that can be protected by Domestic Violence Order
   - Power of Court to make Domestic Violence Orders
   § Property Disputes in De Facto Relationships
   - Property Law Amendment Act 1999 (Qld)
   - Available remedies in relationships not affected by legislation
   - Resulting trust: Calverley v Green (2985) DFC 95-006; Macchi v Scott (1991) DFC 95-104
   § Express and implied intentions to gift
   § Constructive trusts
   § Objective common intention/representation: Green v Green (1989)
   § Unconscionability: Muschinski v Dodds (1985); Baumgartner v Baumgartner (1988); Parij v
   Parij (1998)
   Other available remedies
   - Express trust
   - Express contracts
   - Implied contracts
   - Equitable liens
   - Undue influence
   - Quantum meruit
   - Quasi contract
   - Implied partnership
   - Cohabitation and separation agreements
   § Special Medical Procedures for Children
   - Division 4.2.3 FLR 2004
   - Consideration of Practice Note made by Judge Administrator of Northern Region of the
   Family Court of Australia (2/96 re "The Guidelines and Protocols" relating to:
   · The protocols between the Family Court of Australia (Northern Region),
   Department Families, Youth and Community Care (Queensland) and the Legal
   Aid Office (Queensland) with respect to the process of obtaining Court Approval
   for special medical procedures for children in Queensland.
   · The "Standard Approach" to be followed when considering whether a child should
   undergo a special medical procedure that may permanently effect his/her qualify
   of life